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 Abstract 
This paper examines the changing realities in South Asia and takes a fresh look at the 
prospects and challenges for regional economic integration in the region. In this context, 
the two central arguments of this paper are, first that there have been and continue to be 
some very strong arguments in support of regional economic integration in South Asia. 
Second, in the face of the ongoing developments and changing realities, it is the right time 
to provide the needed push and impetus to this process to take it over the “tipping point”. 
Once over the tipping point, the stronger positive results from regional cooperation will 
push the region to a higher growth trajectory, thereby generating virtuous impulses in sup-
port of cooperation and integration. These will not only benefit South Asia but the rest of 
the world as the region, with its large population and markets, could well become one of 
the major engines for global growth in coming years. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a perceptible change in the environment for promoting regional cooperation and 
economic integration in South Asia. The change is perhaps one of the positive outcomes 
of economic reforms that have been undertaken in nearly all of the South Asian economies 
since the beginning of the nineties. These reforms, most notably in India and Pakistan, 
have not only spurred economic growth in the region, especially in India, but also made 
the region generally more open to greater integration both within the region and with the 
rest of the world. India’s growth has given it greater confidence in opening its markets to 
its neighbours and at the same time clearly brought home to its neighbours the advantages 
of greater access to India’s large and growing market. Other factors that have contributed 
to this positive stance towards regional cooperation in South Asia are the positive demon-
stration effects of bilateral trade agreements in the region in recent years, for example the 
Indo-Sri Lankan Free Trade Agreement; recognition by India and other governments that a 
South Asia lagging in regional cooperation cannot expect to play its due role in the global 
community; and last but not least the growing impact of a resurgent Chinese economy that 
has necessitated a deep rethink of neighbourhood policies by region’s governments, par-
ticularly by India. 
These changing realities in South Asia necessitate a fresh look at the prospects and chal-
lenges for regional economic integration in the region. In this context, the two central ar-
guments of this paper are, first that there have been and continue to be some very strong 
arguments in support of regional economic integration in South Asia. Second, in the con-
text of the ongoing developments and changing realities mentioned above, it is the right 
time to provide the needed push and impetus to this process to take it over the “tipping 
point”. Once over the tipping point, the stronger positive results from regional cooperation 
will push the region to a higher growth trajectory, thereby generating virtuous impulses in 
support of cooperation and integration. These will not only benefit South Asia but the rest 
of the world as the region, with its large population and markets could well become one of 
the major engines for global growth in coming years. 
The next section provides a historical background for regional cooperation in South Asia 
including the formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
Section 3 gives some explanations for the current low levels of intra-South Asian trade 
and economic cooperation. This has some significant implications for India’s neighbour-
hood policies. The changing global and regional realities that are now providing fresh im-
petus to the regional dynamics are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 then looks at the mo-
tivations for regional cooperation in South Asia. It also discusses the reasons for which 
India, the dominant economy in South Asia, should support regional cooperation and eco-
nomic integration in the region. The concluding section brings together the main argu-
ments and summarises the discussion. 
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2 The background for regional cooperation in South Asia 
South Asia is home to about one and half billion people or 23 % of the world population.1 
Its share in world gross domestic product (GDP) remains at barely 2.3 %. The eight coun-
tries in the region – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka – have diverse economic features with India and Pakistan being the two 
largest economies in terms of the regional GDP and population. But India’s dominance in 
nearly all respects is a central and special feature of the region that can be seen as both a 
positive and negative feature in the context of promoting greater economic cooperation. 
India has nearly 77.8 % of the region’s GDP, accounts for 40.3 % of its trade and 75.8 % 
of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI). It is the only country in South Asia that has 
common borders with all others. India is both literally and otherwise central to South Asia. 
However, in terms of economic well-being, as measured by the human development in-
dex, Sri Lanka and Maldives are better off than the other six.2 However, the region shares 
the dubious credit of having the second largest concentration of the world’s poor after 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with 47 % of the South Asian population living on less than $ 1/day. 
Recent estimates in India put the share of population with less than $ 0.5 per day at more 
than 50 %.3 Alleviating widespread poverty, sustaining employment generation, improv-
ing infrastructure, and sustaining rapid and inclusive economic growth remain the com-
mon and pressing challenges in all the countries of the region. 
Countries in South Asia have had strong economic, trade and cultural ties for centuries. 
These were generally seen by their inhabitants and rulers as a connected land mass and 
integrated economic space well before they became part of the British Indian Empire. 
Thus, the three largest South Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had a 
common market with an integrated monetary and communication system until 1947, that 
is well ahead of the formation of the European Common Market in 1958. These ties were 
disrupted with independence from colonial rule, and significant political differences and 
conflicts characterised the region during the second-half of the twentieth century. The 
situation worsened further in the seventies and eighties with ethnic strife resulting in the 
break up of Pakistan and continued violence in Sri Lanka and parts of India and Pakistan. 
Afghanistan has also seen enormous instability and disruption over the last three decades. 
Thus, despite its common heritage going back centuries, South Asia has today emerged as 
the least integrated and one of the more unstable regions in the world. 
                                                 
1 See World Development Indicators Database. Data on Afghanistan which joined in 2006 is not avail-
able. 
2 Maldives has long moved beyond the threshold levels of income and quality of life for being part of the 
group of least developed countries (LDCs). In 2004, the UN General Assembly decided to graduate 
Maldives out of the LDC group, but revised the decision following the devastation caused by the tsu-
nami a few days later. Maldives will be graduated out of the LDCs group in 2011 (UNCTAD 2006b, 
47). 
3 See the report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (2007), also known 
as the Arjun Sengupta Commission Report. 
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The establishment of SAARC in 1985 was an attempt to reverse the conflicting tendencies 
of the post-independence era.4 The move was initiated by Ziaur Rahman in Bangladesh 
and taken forward by young leaders like Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and Rajiv Gandhi in 
India. It could be seen a premature and top-down attempt at promoting regional coopera-
tion, since ground realities in terms of trade and investment flows, and political will were 
not really in place to support such an effort. In any case with the political demise of these 
leaders in the latter eighties, the SAARC process lost its champions and became somewhat 
directionless. This loss of political support at the top, combined with the usual degree of 
mutual mistrust and preoccupation with domestic fire-fighting has resulted in lack of real 
progress in the more than two decades since SAARC was established. 
Today the region has emerged as perhaps one of the most troubled and unstable neighbour-
hoods. Six (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) of the eight cur-
rent members are grappling with racial, communal, extremist or regional strife. Some of this 
strife is now decades old and well entrenched. With two of the major powers being armed 
with nuclear weapons and armed conflict in several sub-regions, it will be fair for an out-
sider to characterise South Asia as a potential flashpoint for major conflagration. India can-
not assume, as some tend to argue, that its own economic growth and prosperity will remain 
unaffected by the disturbed and unstable conditions in the region. India must ensure greater 
peace and stability in the region in order to achieve its objectives of rapid, inclusive and sus-
tained growth and improvement in the people’s living standards. 
India’s size and central location in South Asia makes the region quite unique and compli-
cates the case for regional integration. For instance, in 2006 India accounted close to four-
fifths of the regional GDP by value, while Bhutan and Maldives accounted for less than 
one-hundredth. Pakistan, the next largest economy after India, accounted for 11 % of the 
regional GDP, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Simi-
larly, India accounts for 74 % of the regional population, Pakistan for 13 %, Bangladesh 
for 10 %, Nepal for 2 % and Sri Lanka for 1 %. The smaller South Asian countries are far 
less diversified and have a relatively under-developed industrial structure. This makes 
them reluctant to push forward with regional liberalisation due to (in my view a com-
pletely misplaced) fear of being swamped by Indian businesses, resulting in a possible de-
industrialisation of their economies. India on the other hand, had so far held back on fur-
ther regional liberalisation for two reasons. First due to a lack of full-reciprocity from 
partner countries. Second, and perhaps more important, due to a perception, which has 
only changed in the last few years, that regional cooperation is a mere euphemism for the 
smaller countries to “gang up” against India and not recognising its claims to be the pre-
eminent regional power. This was reflected in the persistence of the Indian establishment 
on using the term the “Indian sub-continent’ rather than the more neutral South Asia that 
has come to be used only in the last two to three years.5 
                                                 
4 SAARC was established by the seven countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan became the 8th member more recently in 2005. 
5 Historically, this region has been referred to as the Indian sub-continent, which results in some level of 
apprehension in the smaller countries about their ability to retain their individual identity in the post 
SAARC context. This is now changing to a more common use of “South Asia” for describing the re-
gion. 
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However, India’s stance has been changing in recent years. Presently, India recognises the 
advantages of an integrated South Asian economic space for all SAARC members, includ-
ing itself, as equal partners in any regional cooperation initiative. This tendency needs to 
be further strengthened and can emerge as the major driver for regional cooperation in 
South Asia. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SAARC country shares of regional gross domestic product, 2006 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
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3 Low level of integration in South Asia: Some explanations 
The South Asia region remains a small player in global markets, accounting for a little 
over 1 % of total global trade. During the period 1995 to 2006 South Asia’s share in world 
merchandise exports marginally increased from 0.9% to 1.3 %.6 In commercial services 
exports, the region’s share in total world exports has increased from 0.87 % in 1995 to 
3.1 % in 2006.7 Within the region too, the persistence of trade barriers has led to abys-
mally low levels of intra-SAARC trade. 
In 2006, the total value of merchandise trade reported by the South Asian countries (ex-
cluding Bhutan) was US$ 395.96 billion, of which only US$ 18.61 billion was destined 
for SAARC Members states.8 This implies that intra-regional trade in South Asia ac-
counted for barely 4.7 % of its total world trade. During 1991 to 2006, the intra-SAARC 
merchandise trade has been stagnating between 3-5 % of the region’s total world trade 
(Figure 2). 
While some studies using gravity models indicate that India’s bilateral trade potential with 
its neighbours remains largely untapped (e.g., Batra 2004) and regional trade can increase 
                                                 
6 Estimated from WDI. 
7 Indeed, while South Asia’s share in total Asian merchandise exports was only 4 % in 2005, its share in 
Asian services exports was 11.6 % by value in the same year. 
8 Based on IMF DOTS data on exports from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka. 
Figure 2: Share of intra-regional trade in total trade of SAARC countries, 1991–2006 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated with data from IMF DoTS 
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significantly with regional cooperation, there are several explanations for the low levels of 
integration in South Asia. 
Given the prospect of trade diversion and unequal sharing of benefits and the relatively 
high levels of protection in the region, several empirical studies have argued that gains 
from trade expansion in the framework of a regional free trade agreement (FTA) in South 
Asia could be expected to be minimal.9 However, some researchers have also found that 
gains from regional economic cooperation, specially if it leads to greater investment flows, 
can yield substantial net benefits.10 Regional integration agreements and FTAs in particu-
lar can also fail when the impact of liberalisation is asymmetric across partners and correc-
tive redistribution mechanisms are lacking. Asymmetric benefits and costs associated with 
regional integration may create political tensions and result in defaults in commitment 
among the member countries (World Bank 2005). In South Asia, in particular, economic 
gains from integration are perceived to be asymmetric and potentially adverse for the 
smaller members. 
Another notable feature of South Asia that could explain the low level of gains emerging 
from regional cooperation could be the substantial informal or border trade. In the case of 
some SAARC members this is reportedly even larger than the official trade flows.11 The 
thriving illegal trade is mainly driven by differences in the tariff structures among the 
South Asian countries, as well as the incidence of high transactions costs in the formal 
routes. However, even if one takes into account the informal trade of the region, the total 
intra-regional trade would still remain less than a tenth of the region’s total trade. Major 
reasons for this low level of intra-regional trade are as follows: 
(i) Too small and too few with similar revealed comparative advantage: The South 
Asian region comprises of only eight countries with a marked imbalance created 
by the dominance of the Indian economy. Large economies like India and the US 
tend to be less trade oriented (Newfarmer 2004), although this has not been the ex-
perience in the case of China. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) has even less number of member countries than SAARC and is also 
dominated by a large country. However, a critical difference between the two re-
gional formations has been the pro-active role played by the US in forging NAFTA 
compared to the passive and at times negative stance adopted in the past by India. 
Furthermore, an analysis of trade flows in South Asia indicates that the countries 
have almost identical pattern of revealed comparative advantage in a relatively low 
                                                 
9 Bandara / Yu (2003) use a general equilibrium model to show that gains under the South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) are skewed with only India gaining substantially, while Pitigala (2005) and Bay-
san / Panagariya / Pitigala (2006) argue that given the level of protection in South Asia vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world, risk of trade-diversion is rather high. 
10 Using a gravity model, Hirantha (2004) finds evidence of significant trade creation under the South 
Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA), which came into effect in December 1995, and no evidence of 
trade diversion effect with the rest of the world. 
11 For instance Taneja (1999) shows that bilateral unofficial trade (exports plus imports) of India with 
Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka was estimated to be more than their respective official trade in 
the 1990s. Taneja provides a good overview of the causes, pattern and extent of informal trade among 
SAARC countries. 
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range of products, and bilateral trade exhibits low levels of trade complementari-
ties (Kemal 2004). However, as will be discussed later, intra-industry trade should 
offer substantial potential also for SAARC, as has been the case in other regions. 
(ii) Fear of India: In some South Asian countries there is real fear of de-
industrialisation if preferential market access is provided to the larger and better 
established Indian manufactures. For example, in Pakistan where the textiles and 
clothing sector is considered to be the major driving force for economic growth, 
and contributed more than 65 % in total export value in 2004 (State Bank of Paki-
stan 2006), there is widespread feeling that freer Indian imports could mortally 
harm the Pakistani textile industry.12 This fear is actually more pronounced in the 
bureaucracies than among the entrepreneurial classes. These fears have weakened 
because of the positive outcomes of Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral FTA which has 
benefited both sides equally.13 
(iii) Weak port and transport infrastructure: The poor port and transport infrastructure 
is one of the major reasons for low-integration in the region (as well as an obstacle 
to growth for the region)14. Delays in transit due to road or port congestion, and 
customs procedures (non-tariff barriers) raise the costs for exporters. The limita-
tions are in both physical (lack of cargo/ship handling equipment) as well as non-
physical infrastructure (excessive and cumbersome border procedures). One esti-
mate shows that if South Asia’s infrastructure capacity is increased even halfway 
to East Asia’s level, then intra-regional trade can increase by 60 % (Wilson / Os-
tuki 2005). 
(iv) Persistence of high levels of overall protection: The South Asian region as a whole 
has been one of the more heavily protected regions in the world. In particular, In-
dia is considered to be the least open among the group in terms of trade-weighted 
average applied tariff rate of 30.1 %, followed by Bangladesh with 21.3 %, Paki-
stan with 17.4 %, and Nepal with 15.5 %, while Sri Lanka is the most open with an 
average applied tariff of 6.2 % (UNCTAD 2005 ). These high tariffs are expected 
to decline under SAFTA when it is fully implemented. However, a wide range of 
non-tariff barriers are also used by these countries to protect their markets. These 
are more difficult to identify and remove. However, in this area too, there are signs 
of progress in the last two years. 
(v) Difficult business environment: Besides the high levels of protection in the region, 
procedural delays stemming from institutional requirements have been a major fac-
tor inhibiting trade and business across borders. In particular, South Asia ranks 
among the lowest (second last or 139th) among regions across the world in terms 
                                                 
12 In Pakistan, as in most of the other SAARC nations, the export sector is far less diversified than that of 
India. Hence the threat of a more competitive partner (namely India) eroding competitiveness in their 
core export segments is a significant concern. 
13 For an analysis of the effects of the Indo-Sri Lankan FTA see Das (2008). 
14 De (2005). 
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of ease of trading across borders (the last being Sub-Saharan Africa).15 In contrast, 
China’s rank is a healthy 38th in the world. 
(vi) Restrictive rules of origin and destination: Rules of origin in preferential or free 
trade agreements help determine the products for tariff preferences, but tighter 
rules of origin often reflect protectionist intention. The co-existence of high tariff 
barriers and tight rules of origin raises the risk of trade-diversion.16 SAARC mem-
bers specify the port of entry sometimes for all imports and often for selective 
products. While this approach has been implemented to curb illegal imports, it also 
seems to be driven by inadequate administrative capacity. But the port-specific re-
strictions have increased transactions costs of formal trade and bolstered the in-
formal border trade. 
(vii) Lack of coverage and commitment in the merchandise trade agreement: The liber-
alisation in merchandise trade as envisioned in SAFTA is much less ambitious 
than what the South Asian countries have themselves been autonomously pursuing 
under the regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The SAFTA tariff lib-
eralisation programme also allows members to retain a negative list of items that 
are not offered for concessional treatment. Almost 53 % of the total imports be-
tween SAFTA members has been subject to the negative lists of the respective 
countries. Among the large member countries India and Sri Lanka have restricted 
up to 38 % and 52 % respectively of their total imports by value from the SAFTA 
members under the sensitive list category (Weerakoon / Thenakoon 2006). The 
negative lists thus continue to significantly limit the scope of the South Asian 
“Free Trade” regime. 
(viii) Services not included in regional trade agreement: The services sector accounts for 
more than half the GDP in most South Asian economies. However, trade in ser-
vices is conspicuous by its absence under the SAFTA. This is paradoxical espe-
cially considering that the region as a whole is emerging as a strong exporter of 
commercial services worldwide. Most of the South Asian countries have been ne-
gotiating liberalisation of the services sector under the WTO, and a liberalisation 
exercise at the regional level would be a good testing ground for this dynamic sec-
tor. 
4 Changing realities in South Asia 
Contrary to general expectations, SAARC managed to push through a new free-trade 
agreement – albeit SAFTA might be described as a watered down version of an FTA – in 
its twenty-first year. It indicates that there remains sufficient political will among partici-
                                                 
15 Cf. World Bank (2006). 
16 Baysan / Panagariya / Pitigala (2006) contend that a persuasive case for SAFTA can be made if the 
countries in the region lower their overall tariff down to 5 % or below, along with easing of the restric-
tive rules of origin and sectoral exceptions. 
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pating countries to keep the forum alive. The coverage of the issues under the annual 
agenda in the past fourteen summits indicates that the focus has been right by giving prior-
ity for regional cooperation in sectors such as energy, security, water usage, counter-
terrorism and tourism, among others. Moreover, the new trade pact (SAFTA), although 
imperfect, has potential to be nurtured into a more robust trade deal to ensure greater re-
gional liberalisation and minimisation of risks of extra-regional trade diversion. With ex-
tra-regional partners like the US, Japan and China now apparently keen to join the forum, 
it seems that SAARC will get a new lease of life in the new century. 
India’s perception of SAARC’s usefulness for its own national interests has undergone a 
marked change in recent yeas. This change has been due to several reasons. First, it is now 
evident to Indian policy makers that SAARC can hardly be used by its smaller neighbours 
as a forum for India baiting or even for achieving a better strategic balance vis-à-vis India. 
Experience over the past two decades has now demonstrated that coalition formation by 
neighbouring countries is not likely to be successful because of the dynamics between 
these countries themselves and their inevitable need to deal with India directly given the 
geographic and economic realities. 
Second, major global powers, except perhaps China, have finally accepted India’s rela-
tively dominant position in South Asia, specially following the robust economic growth 
since 1991. There is consequently no significant on their part to “redress the asymmetry” 
within the region by building special relations with India’s neighbours. This has also 
helped to bring about a change in India’s perception about the possible threats from a suc-
cessful SAARC. 
Third, China’s growing influence in South Asia is clearly visible and poses a clear chal-
lenge for India to maintain its own interests in the region. More significantly, bilateral 
trade volumes between some of the South Asian economies and China are larger than with 
India. This is despite China not having any preferential/free trade agreement with these 
countries as India has. Of course, China has long pushed for a strategic political-economic 
relationship with Pakistan, and finally signed a FTA in 2006 which envisages a multi-
dimensional economic partnership on energy, communication, agriculture, technical coop-
eration, joint investment ventures, etc. (People’s Daily 2006). This has finally caused the 
positive response within the Ministry of External Affairs in India to secure its own inter-
ests in South Asia and see SAARC as an instrumentality for bringing its neighbouring 
economies within a network of regional production network as China has successfully 
achieved with its Southeast Asian neighbours. 
Fourth, Delhi seems to have realised that regional cooperation, through SAARC or other 
formations like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), is perhaps an effective instrument for securing India’s territorial 
integrity in the peripheral regions and for fighting poverty in its border states. The change 
in India’s perception about regional cooperation in South Asia is best seen by the Indian 
government’s recent acceptance of a role of multilateral organisations in infrastructure de-
velopment and improving connectivity in its border regions. 
Fifth, until the Mumbai terrorist attack of 26 November 2008, Indo-Pak relations had 
shown a consistent improvement over the last four years. Given that the political tension 
between the two countries has hindered regional cooperation and continues to hold hos-
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tage the full implementation of SAFTA today, this improvement contributed significantly 
to the prospect of pushing SAARC forward. Such terrorist actions are perpetrated by 
fringe extremist elements and their benefactors who see progress in regional cooperation 
and economic integration as threatening their own petty vested interests. It is, therefore, 
important that actions of religious and sectarian terrorist groups are not allowed to push 
the SAARC process backward. Indian establishment will do well to target these elements 
on the one hand for punitive action while promoting greater trade and other economic in-
teraction across South Asian borders on the other. Successful economic integration will be 
one of the most effective responses to sectarian violence as it will contribute to eroding the 
economic and material base for such movements. 
For all the above reasons, the India’s perception of SAARC and attitude toward regional 
cooperation in South Asia has perceptibly changed. This is most clearly visible in India 
taking unilateral action of allowing duty free imports from its low income neighbours 
within South Asia and permitting multilateral organisations to participate in regional infra-
structure projects, which it had not done in the past. 
The changing realities of a globalising world have prompted India to accept countries 
from outside the region to become observers in SAARC and also stop treating South Asia 
as its exclusive backyard in which it would only pursue bilateral interaction and not brook 
any regional or multilateral intervention. The terrorist threat to India and Pakistan is 
prompting the ruling establishments (with the notable exception of the ISI in Pakistan 
which apparently has its own agenda) in the two countries to improve their relationship 
and support political dialogue to ensure political stability and social harmony. Moreover, 
there is pressure from the growing industrial and middle classes in emerging South Asian 
economies to expand business and social contacts within SAARC, especially to try and 
take advantage of the burgeoning Indian market. 
The changing global context has made it clear to India and other countries like Bangla-
desh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives that they also stand to gain from any forward movement 
in SAARC. Pakistan remains a reluctant participant as revealed by its continued denial of 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India.17 The biggest potential gainer today could 
be Afghanistan with better access to Indian investment and other resources and by re-
claiming its historical role as the bridge between Central and South Asia. Thus, the chang-
ing realities not only make SAARC a viable undertaking but one with significant positive 
outcomes for its members both in the immediate and the longer term. It is perhaps for this 
reason that external members like China, Japan, the US and even the European Union 
(EU) have either already acquired or have expressed their desire to achieve observer status 
in SAARC. 
                                                 
17 Implementation of SAFTA began 1 July 2006. Indian has provided MFN to Pakistan, however, the latter 
has refused to grant the MFN status to India, based on their continued territorial conflict over the state of 
Kashmir. 
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5 Motivations for regional cooperation in South Asia 
The motivation for greater integration in the South Asian region follows from four distinct 
factors: First, pure economic gains through efficient use of capital and labour and freer 
cross-border movement of goods and services. Second, other non-traditional gains from 
greater regional integration like increased flow of FDI. Third, strategic gains when the 
South Asian countries negotiate as a unified group in multilateral fora. Fourth, develop-
mental and environmental efficiency gains arising from adopting a regionally integrated 
approach towards provision of regional public goods like environmental protection, water 
conservation and other natural resources including the regional ecosystem and related bio-
diversity. These regional issues cannot be effectively addressed individually and are best 
addressed in a cooperative framework. 
While the economic and less traditional economic gains that arise from intra-industry trade 
and investment flows are well discussed in the literature, it is useful to point to the politi-
cal and security motivations for regional cooperation in South Asia. These considerations 
are often the main driving force behind the emergence of regional blocs (Crawford / 
Fiorentino 2005). For example, it was the fear of China’s dominance that drove the South-
east Asian economies to forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and even the EU was seen as a response to the emergence of the East European bloc under 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In both these cases economic gains fol-
lowed regional integration that was perhaps motivated initially by non-economic rationale. 
To the extent that political considerations dominate economic considerations in the forma-
tion of regional blocs, it is political commitment (or the lack thereof) that determines the 
success (or failure) of free trade agreements (Hossain / Duncan 1998). Greater regional 
and bilateral cooperation within emerging economies can also be seen as a response to the 
slow progress in multilateral trade regimes and increasing recourse to regionalism within 
developed economies.18 
The other main driver of economic integration in South Asia is the need for greater energy 
security. All these countries are heavily dependent on energy imports and even more spe-
cifically on hydrocarbon imports from West Asia. At the greater Asian regional level the 
SAARC economies can be seen to offer a unified market for hydrocarbon imports from 
Central and West Asian gas and oil fields by overland pipelines. Energy trade in the region 
can also be seen as a confidence-building measure and a lock-in mechanism for irreversi-
ble economic interdependence (Pandian 2005). With Afghanistan’s membership in the 
SAARC, the region can expect further potential gains through alliance with Central Asian 
countries. In particular, it provides greater connectivity with Central Asia and beyond, and 
brings in significant energy security payoffs. 
Despite some recent changes, the Indian stance towards SAARC still remains somewhat 
equivocal and unclear. This is direct outcome of the perception that SAARC cannot really 
move forward because the Pakistani establishment will simply not let it progress. There-
fore, it is argued that India’s national interests are better served by supporting other initia-
                                                 
18 See Schott (2008). 
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tives like the BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim and the Swarnbhoomi initiatives. I find 
these arguments to be misplaced and argue for India to give its fullest and proactive sup-
port to making SAARC successful. The major reasons in support of my argument for India 
to actively support SAARC are as follows: 
i) Make de facto the de jure: De facto, India already has extensive informal interac-
tion with its neighbours in the form of border trade. By activating SAFTA and fol-
lowing it with an agreement on trade in services, India will only convert the pre-
sent de facto situation to a de jure one, which will have therefore no additional im-
pact on the Indian industry or services sectors. It will permit India to better regu-
late and oversee the trade and prevent trafficking. 
ii) Increase FDI: South Asia’s low level of regional integration is also reflected in the 
relatively low level of FDI inflows to the region. Although in recent years, FDI in-
flows have increased rapidly, with gross FDI reaching $ 10 billion in 2005-06, it 
still continues to be below the potential, especially considering India’s economic 
performance and policy changes (UNCTAD 2006a). There is no doubt that a more 
peaceful, stable and regionally integrated South Asia will attract greater volumes 
of FDI into South Asia and this will have significant positive implications for 
achieving rapid inclusive growth.19 
iii) Dynamic trade gains: The economic case for greater merchandise trade still holds, 
notwithstanding that econometric studies tend to highlight rather small gains from 
SAFTA. The Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral trade agreement shows that contrary to 
findings of quantitative models, trade between India and Sri-Lanka increased sig-
nificantly following their bilateral free trade agreement.20 Trade grew because of 
an increase in trade of new products that were not earlier traded and could not 
thereby be captured in the modelling exercises.21 Moreover, these quantitative ex-
ercises singularly lack the ability to capture gains from intra-industry trade, the 
scope for which is significant in the region. 
iv) Enhanced security: Increasing inequity fuels insecurity and cross-border terrorism. 
Thus it is in India’s interest to help improve the standard of living and reduce pov-
erty in the smaller South Asian economies as she continues to pursue the path of 
high growth. India can hardly hope to remain an island of sustained economic 
growth if the growth impetus is not shared with or transferred to neighbouring 
countries (ADB 2006, 146). 
                                                 
19 See the discussion by Kubny / Mölders / Nunnenkamp (2008). 
20 The gravity model analysis of Batra (2004) found that India’s bilateral trade with Sri Lanka and Nepal 
has gone far beyond the level of trade predicted on the basis of natural factors (distance, landlockedness, 
population, and income) based on 2000 data. For a discussion of trade-FDI-poverty alleviation effects of 
the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral trade agreement see Das (2008). 
21 How much of this trade expansion represents trade diversion or trade creation is still an open question 
(Baysan / Panagariya / Pitigala 2006). 
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v) Returns to scale: Regional integration will provide a larger market and also scope 
for intra-industry trade. Both features will benefit the Indian and South Asian in-
dustry to lower costs and become more globally competitive by exploiting econo-
mies of scale and scope. Even small and medium-sized South Asian companies 
will benefit by improving their global competitiveness in a phased manner by ini-
tially producing for SAARC markets and then striking out for a greater share in 
global markets. 
vi) Increased efficiency in the provision of public goods and services: The South 
Asian subcontinent is an integrated geo-ecological system. In this context, it can be 
easily seen that some public goods and services like energy, water management 
and conservation, prevention against pandemics and maximising tourist earnings 
are best achieved on a regional basis. Given that India shares its borders with all 
SAARC members, it is in her interest to ensure that a cooperative approach is 
taken to address these issues of the delivery of regional public goods and markets. 
vii) Connectivity payoffs with the rest of Asia: Today, regional cooperation is gaining 
momentum in other sub-regions in Asia. Several Southeast Asian countries have 
come together under the Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation (GMS) initiative, 
promoted largely by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This is helping build 
the regional infrastructure from Myanmar eastwards and southwards. The Central 
Asian economies are coming together under the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) programme that is being actively pushed by China. A re-
gionally integrated South Asian space will help realise trans-Asian connectivity 
and greater energy security as resources from Central and West Asia could be 
moved eastwards up to China. In such a scenario India along with its neighbours 
would benefit significantly from greater flow of trade, commerce and investment 
from West and Central Asia to East and Southeast Asia via South Asia. 
viii) Achieving greater social cohesion within India: By connecting the diverse ethnic 
groups within India with their counterparts across the borders, India’s multi-
religious, multi-ethnic and pluralistic society would be greatly strengthened. This 
pluralistic polity will be further preserved and nurtured if the various ethnic and re-
ligious communities within India can freely interact with their communities across 
the Indian borders and as a result feel less isolated or pressurised as a minority 
within India. This is an important reason for India to support SAARC as its func-
tioning has the potential to facilitate India’s on going modernisation. This would 
also contribute to a greater enrichment of the cultural diversity that is a hallmark of 
the South Asian subcontinent. 
ix) Defining and defending India’s regional space: Regional integration has been used 
to achieve strategic objectives rather than simply economic gains. If India does not 
establish stronger ties with its immediate neighbours and thus secure its regional 
space, it will soon find itself isolated. China is now making significant efforts to 
improve its access to South Asian economies and markets. South Asian countries, 
acutely aware of China’s advances in Tibet, Myanmar and Xingjian, see significant 
advantages in improving their ties with China rather than wait indefinitely for 
South Asia to move forward. For example, the China-Pakistan agreement signed in 
November 2006 envisions a multi-dimensional economic partnership on energy, 
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communication, agriculture, technical cooperation, joint investment company, etc, 
besides trade.22 Therefore, it is important for India to ensure greater integration of 
the South Asian space. We should be open to all interested bilateral and multilat-
eral agencies who may want to play a role in achieving this. 
6 Conclusion 
In the rapidly changing global environment, regional integration in South Asia has as-
sumed a new strategic significance. Not surprisingly, the potential political-economic and 
strategic gains from SAARC for all member countries have increased significantly. As the 
largest economy of the region, it is imperative and an opportune time for India to take a 
lead in building an environment of trust among SAARC members, which would encour-
age greater commitment to regional integration by all. India stands to gain substantially 
from greater economic integration in the region, in terms of both economic and non-
economic or strategic payoffs. Indeed, India’s emergence in the world economic order in 
the twenty-first century will be greatly facilitated if she ensures a stable, peaceful, secure 
and thereby a prosperous South Asian region. South Asia, stretching from Kabul to Chit-
tagong and form Kashmir to Colombo has historically been an integrated economic, cul-
tural and environment space. The fragmentation of this space, at the time of the region’s 
independence from colonial rule, needs to be reversed. This is a necessary condition for 
the region and its member countries to fully exploit their potential and achieve their objec-
tive of achieving rapid, sustainable and inclusive economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The FTA will reduce or eliminate tariffs on all products in two phases beginning July 2007, and is ex-
pected to increase their bilateral trade from US$ 4.3 billion (in 2005) to US$ 15 billion in five years (cf. 
People’s Daily 2006). 
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